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A STATISTICAL LOOK AT THE SUPREME COURT'S 2009
TERM





Whether a change in membership occurs or not,
every Supreme Court term presents a unique set of
controversies and decisions for legal scholars to examine.
Herein, we offer a discussion of the Court's recently
completed 2009-2010 term. Rather than analyzing specific
opinions in detail (as many have already done), we generate
a comprehensive statistical analysis of justice voting
behavior for the term. In particular, we examine consensus
and division on the Court, the ideological tenor of the term,
voting alignments among the justices, the production of
opinions, and the Court's overall ideological spectrum
based on individual voting patterns. Ultimately, we also
assess the ramifications of our findings for the future study
of judicial behavior.
Production of Opinions
The Court handed down ninety full-opinion
decisions during the 2009 term. Seventeen of these
decisions came by way of per curiam opinions.4 Ten of
these per curiam opinions came in unanimous decisions,
but the Court issued per curiam opinions in seven non-
' John M. Scheb, II is a Professor of Political Science at the University
of Tennessee, Knoxville.
2 Colin Glennon is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the
University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
3 Hemant Kumar Sharma is a Lecturer in Political Science at the
University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
4 "For the Court," i.e., not attributed to any particular justice.
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unanimous decisions as well. In the seventy-three cases
with signed majority opinions, the workload was evenly
distributed.5 All members of the Court wrote either eight
or nine majority opinions, with the exception of Justice
Stevens, who authored only six majority opinions. Justice
Stevens, however, was the most prolific opinion writer
overall, due predominantly to the fact that he wrote nearly
twice as many dissents as anyone else on the Court. Justice
Sonia Sotomayor opened her freshman term by writing the
initial opinion of the Court, a unanimous decision in
Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter.6 Sotomayor went on to
write an additional seven majority opinions, which put her
at the Court's mean. Half of Justice Sotomayor's opinions
for the Court involved unanimous cases; she also penned
two concurrences, four dissents, and two opinions in which
she concurred in part and dissented in part.
Table 1: Production of Opinions, 2009 Term
Concurring/
Dissenting Total
Majority Concurring Dissenting in Part Opinions
Stevens 6 13 12 2 33
Scalia 8 15 6 0 29
Thomas 8 13 4 1 26
Alito 8 10 7 0 25
Breyer 9 6 7 2 24
Kennedy 9 8 4 0 21
Sotomayor 8 2 4 2 16
Ginsburg 9 3 3 0 15
Roberts 8 3 2 2 15
5 See Table 1: Production of Opinions, 2009 Term.
6 Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009).
2
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 9
Consensus and Division on the Court
In terms of the political ideology of decisions, much
of the public discussion of the Court's 2009 term centered
around two high-profile cases, Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission7 and McDonald v. City of Chicago.8
In Citizens United, the Court struck down a federal law
limiting electioneering communications by corporations
and labor unions.9 In McDonald, the Court struck down a
Chicago ordinance that effectively banned the possession
of handguns. °  Both decisions were widely seen as
conservative; both were enormously controversial; and both
were five-to-four rulings. Because the media, the attentive
public, and the scholarly community focus on cases like
these, where the Court is sharply divided, it seems that
attention is often drawn to ideological divisions on the
Court.
However, it should not be overlooked that,
statistically, during the 2009 term, there was a substantial
degree of consensus on the Court. This is not a new
development. In fact, since 1953, the average number of
unanimous decisions has been 41 percent.1 ' In the 2009
term, 44.0 percent of the Court's decisions were
unanimous. 12
Further, 29.7 percent of all cases saw either a six or
seven vote majority, indicating some controversy among
the justices, but not a division that can be explained strictly
along ideological lines.
13
7 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
8 McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
9 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
10 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.
" HAROLD J. SPAETH ET AL., SUPREME COURT DATABASE CODE BOOK,
available at http://scdb.wustl.edu (last visited June 1, 2010).
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Finally, 20.9 percent of the decisions could be
classified as sharply divided-i.e., five-to-four rulings.
Table 2 illustrates the breakdown of decisions by number
of votes in the majority.14
Table 2: Number of Decisions by Voting Margin,
2009-2010 Term







Ideological Tenor of the 2009 Term
In a recent article in the New York Times, Adam
Liptak asserted that the Roberts Court is "the most
conservative one in living memory ...... ,15 According to
Liptak, "In its first five years, the Roberts court issued
conservative decisions 58 percent of the time. And, in the
term ending a year ago, the rate rose to 65 percent, the
highest number in any year since at least 1953. ' '16
Our coding of decisions handed down during the 2009
term,1 7 however, reveals a significant reduction in the
proportion of conservative decisions. As can be seen in
Table 3, when all decisions are considered, including the
14 id.
15 Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decade,




17 HAROLD J. SPAETH ET AL., SUPREME COURT DATABASE CODE BOOK,
available at http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var =
decisionDirection (last visited July 27, 2010).
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forty-four cases that are unanimous, the rate of
conservative decisions in the 2009 term is 51.1 percent.
When viewed in its totality, then, the 2009 term
appears to have been a rather moderate one. Whether this
is a single term aberration or the beginning of a shift in the
Court's ideological leanings remains to be seen.
Furthermore, whether this figure is skewed in any way by
the large number of unanimous cases (which are more
prevalent than they have been since 2005) also requires
investigation.
Table 3: Ideological Direction of Decision and Issue Type
by Unanimous/Non-unanimous Decision
Ideological Unanimous Nonunanimous All
Direction Decisions
Conservative 41.0% 59.2% 51.1%
Liberal 59.0% 40.8% 48.9%
Issue Type Unanimous Nonunanimous All
Decisions
Civil 50.0% 56.9% 53.8%
Rights/Liberties
Economic 27.5% 23.5% 25.3%
Other 22.5% 19.6% 20.9%
As shown in Table 3, there is a significant difference in
the ideological direction of the unanimous and non-
unanimous decisions. Fifty-nine percent of the unanimous
decisions were liberal, while only 41.0 percent of the
unanimous decisions were conservative. It is also
interesting to note that 50.0 percent of the Court's
unanimous decisions involved issues of civil rights or
liberties, matters on which we would expect disagreement
along ideological lines. While these findings could be a
5
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one-term anomaly, historical evidence suggests that they
are not, as previous examinations of the Vinson, Warren,
and Burger Courts reveal, among other things, that liberal
outcomes were consistently more likely in unanimous cases
during those eras, as well.18 Whether this reflects a general
liberal tenor in more settled areas of law and constitutional
doctrine is one possibility that is open for debate.
Voting Alignments among the Justices
Beyond examining cases themselves, followers of
the Court have long been interested in "voting blocs" on the
bench.' 9  Political scientists have been particularly
concerned with political phenomena that lead to the
formation of blocs of voters within ideological
parameters. 20  Today, for example, it is common to hear
media commentators refer to the Court's "liberal wing" or
"conservative bloc." The 2009 term certainly provides
support for such characterizations, as clear liberal and
conservative coalitions appear.
However, before delving into an assessment of voting
blocs, we must determine whether to examine all decisions,
or simply non-unanimous ones, in our assessment of voting
behavior. Within the judicial behavior literature, there has
been a longstanding debate as to whether unanimous
decisions should be included in measures of judicial
ideology. Early on in the evolution of the field, C. Herman
Pritchett argued that in cases in which there is no dissent,
"presumably the facts and the law are so clear that no
opportunity is allowed for the autobiographies of the
18 See Saul Brenner and Theodore S. Arrington, Unanimous Decision
Making on the U.S. Supreme Court: Case Stimuli and Judicial
Attitudes, 9 POL. BEHAV. 75-86 (1987).
19 Stefanie A. Lindquist et al., The Impact of Presidential Appointments
to the U. S. Supreme Court: Cohesive and Divisive Voting Within
Presidential Blocs, 53 POL. RES. Q. 4, 795-814 (2000).
20 id.
6
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justices to lead them to opposing conclusions." 21 Pritchett
and others who favor this approach suggest that in
unanimous cases, ideological preferences of the judges are
tempered by non-controversial legal factors that lead to the
nine to zero outcome. 22 As a result, they choose to focus
on non-unanimous cases; that is what Jeffrey Segal and
Harold Spaeth do in offering their "attitudinal model,"
which propounds the notion that justices are motivated
solely by their ideological orientations.
23
The rates at which justices agreed with one another in
all non-unanimous cases during the most recent term are
displayed in Table 4. The rates of agreement are consistent
with the ideological leanings that Court followers would
expect from each of the justices. For example, Justice
Thomas agrees much more often with fellow conservatives
Scalia and Alito, and Justice Stevens more often with the
Court's liberal justices, such as Sotomayor and Breyer.
Table 4: Agreement Scores, 2009 Term
(Non-unanimous decisions only)
44.7% 35.4% 70.8% 79.2% 38.6% 64.6% 29.2% 70.8%
77.1% 50.0% 50.0% 79.5% 31.3% 66.7% 33.3%
61.2% 61.2% 75.6% 38.8% 59.2% 40.8%
79.6% 53.3% 65.3% 44.9% 55.1%




21 C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the
United States Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 5, 890
(1941).
22 See id.
23 JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
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The mean level of agreement across all justices for the
term is 54.9 percent. The highest level of agreement is
between Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, who voted
together 85.7 percent of the time. The lowest level of
agreement is between Justice Stevens and Justice Thomas,
who agreed only 24.5 percent of the time. Lawrence Baum
stated that "analyses based solely on non-unanimous
decisions may provide an incomplete picture of individual
and collective voting patterns in the Court's full set of
decisions." 24 This suggests that unanimous cases should
also be accounted for in crafting voting scores, as they still
reveal ideological preferences of the justices.
Consistent with the notion that both kinds of cases
should be examined, Table 5 displays agreement figures
that are based on all decisions, including unanimous ones.
The rates of agreement seen in Table 5 are of course higher
across the Court, and for each pairing of justices. Justice
Thomas still agrees much more often with Justice Scalia
than he does with Justice Stevens, but the extremity of the
difference is attenuated. The mean level of agreement for
all cases in the 2009 term is 75.4 percent. The highest level
of agreement is between Justices Scalia and Thomas, who
voted together 92.0 percent of the time. The lowest level of
agreement involves Justices Stevens and Thomas, who
agreed only 57.5 percent of the time.
24 Lawrence Baum, Membership and Collective Voting Change in the
Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 1, 8 (1992).
8
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 15
Table 5: Agreement Scores, 2009 Term (all decisions)









Given these voting alignments, it is easy to discern
two voting blocs on the Court, as show in Table 6. The
liberal bloc, consisting of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
Sotomayor and Stevens, voted together, on average, 71.5
percent of the time in non-unanimous cases, and 85.0
percent of the time when all decisions are considered. The
conservative bloc, composed of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito and Kennedy, voted
together, on average, 71.6 percent of the time when there
was division, and 84.3 percent of the time in all cases.
Table 6: Voting Blocs on the Court. 2009 Term




Mean Agreement (all decisions) =
85. 0 percent
Mean Agreement (non-unanimous
only) = 71.5 percent
9
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Justice Kennedy: Swing Voter?
In terms of the Court's voting blocs, Justice
Kennedy has often been characterized as the key "swing
vote," (i.e., the one not primarily aligned with either bloc).
Indeed, some commentators have, in recent years, referred
to the Court as "the Kennedy Court," rather than the
Roberts Court, due to Kennedy's inordinate influence as
the Court's swing voter.25 Specific research indicates that
Kennedy has predominately aligned himself with the
conservatives on the court, but has also had a willingness to
veer from his natural bloc in certain case areas, unlike
previously defined swing voters.
26
Yet, as Linda Greenhouse noted recently in the New
York Times, the characterization of Kennedy as a swing
voter may no longer be apt.27 Certainly, it does not apply
to the Court's most recent term, in which Justice Kennedy
voted approximately 82 percent with the other members of
the conservative bloc in all cases (68 percent in non-
unanimous cases) and an average of 73 percent with the
members of the liberal bloc (52 percent in non-unanimous
cases). However, when the majority consisted of only five
justices, Kennedy voted with the other conservatives
approximately 63 percent of the time, but voted with the
liberals, on average, only 26 percent of the time. The gap
between these rates of agreement belies any depiction of
Kennedy as a "swing voter."
25 Patrick D. Schmidt & David A. Yalof, The "Swing Voter" Revisited:
Justice Anthony Kennedy and the First Amendment Right of Free
Speech, 57 POL. RES. Q. 109, 209-17 (2004).
26 id.
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The Court's Ideological Spectrum
Using the well-established coding rules associated
with the Supreme Court Database, we coded the ideological
direction of each of the Court's 2009-2010 decisions.
28
Three of the decisions could not be coded liberal or
conservative. 29  One of the decisions, Skilling v. United
States,30 contained two holdings cutting in opposite
directions, so we coded this case as two decisions.3' Of the
eighty-eight instances that we could code ideologically,
forty-five (51 percent) were conservative rulings and forty-
three (49 percent) were liberal ones. This ideological
balance may well account for the relatively high esteem in
which the American public continues to hold the Court.
32
Figure 1 arrays the justices according to the
percentage of liberal votes cast. In terms of individual
voting scores, Justice Scalia emerges as the Court's most
conservative justice, with a liberal voting score of only 36.4
percent in all cases, and 18.4 percent in non-unanimous
cases. At the other extreme, Justice Stevens completed his
final term on the Court as the most liberal justice, with a
liberal score of 83.7 percent in all cases, and 72.4 percent in
non-unanimous decisions.
28 HAROLD J. SPAETH ET AL., SUPREME COURT DATABASE CODE BOOK,
available at http://scdb.wustl.edu (last visited June 1, 2010).
29 Mohawk Indus., 130 S. Ct. at 599; South Carolina v. North Carolina,
130 S. Ct. 854 (2010); Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295
(2010).
30 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
31 In Skilling, the Court rendered a conservative decision on an issue of
pretrial publicity, but also produced a liberal ruling on the scope of a
federal honest services fraud criminal statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988).
Skilling v. United States, No. 08-1394, slip op. at 1-2 (U.S. June 24,
2010).
32 LINDA SAAD, HIGH COURT TO START TERM WITH NEAR DECADE-
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Consistent with our voting bloc analysis, we can
easily identify the natural ideological break point between
Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy. As show in Figure 1,
Justice Ginsburg, the least liberal member of the Court's
liberal wing, voted liberal in 63.3 percent of non-
unanimous cases; 61.4 percent in all cases. By contrast,
Justice Kennedy's liberal voting score is identical to that of
Chief Justice Roberts (36.7 percent in non-unanimous
cases; 46.6 percent in all cases). Clearly, in terms of bloc
voting, Justice Kennedy belongs with the Court's
conservatives, at least in the 2009 term.
One should note that the five justices who make up
the Court's conservative bloc all vote liberal at a much
higher rate in unanimous cases than they do in non-
unanimous ones, while the four justices in the liberal bloc
do the opposite; they vote liberal at a higher rate in non-
unanimous cases than unanimous ones. One might wonder
why the Court's conservatives are more likely to vote
liberal than the Court's liberals are likely to vote
conservative. Is it because the conservatives are more
collegial than their liberal colleagues? Was this a one term
anomaly? Or does this merely reflect the liberal
underpinnings of modern American law? The answers to
these questions are beyond the scope of this article, but
provide a rich area of exploration for future scholars of
judicial behavior.
12
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6. Nonunanimous Only 0 All Decisions
Justice Sotomayor's First Term
During the battle over Sonia Sotomayor's
nomination to the Supreme Court, there was widespread
speculation as to where she would fit into the Court's
ideological spectrum. The prevailing view was, of course,
that she would join the liberal wing of the Court-it was
simply a matter of how liberal she would rule.
Her behavior during the 2009 Term is consistent
with previous findings that freshman justices do not differ
from their senior colleagues with respect to joining
established voting blocs-as she seems to have settled into
the more liberal side of the liberal bloc.33 The data reveal
that Justice Sotomayor voted, on average, 87 percent of the
time in all cases with the Court's liberals, and only
33 See Terry Bowen & John M. Scheb, II, Reassessing the "Freshman
Effect": The Voting Bloc Alignment of New Justices on the United
States Supreme Court, 1921-90, 15 POL. BEHAV. 1, 1 (1993) (stating
"[f]reshman justices do not differ from their senior colleagues with
respect to bloc voting").
13
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approximately 70 percent of the time with the
conservatives. When considering all cases in which she
voted, she aligned with the term's most liberal justice,
Justice Stevens, 83.7 percent 34 of the time in all cases, and
72.4 percent 35 of the time in non-unanimous cases.
Conversely, she voted with the term's most
conservative justice, Justice Scalia, only 40.0 percent 36 of
the time in non-unanimous cases.
Overall, her liberal voting score in all cases was
67.5 percent 37 and 73.3 percent 38 in non-unanimous
cases-making her the Court's second-most liberal justice,
behind Stevens.
Conclusion
In summary, our most interesting findings revolve
around the vast differences in individual voting behavior in
unanimous and non-unanimous cases. This indicates that,
even in an era where observers are prone to deriding the
politicization of the judicial branch, data indicate that
ideology is not the only factor driving judicial decision-
making. Certain high-profile cases may be more likely to
lead justices to exhibit specific ideological differences, but
the majority of cases seem to involve the location of some
degree of consensus among ideologically disparate actors.
The implication for scholars of the Court is that non-
ideological factors, such as interaction with other justices
and/or adherence to legal or constitutional doctrine, may be
important avenues for further inquiry. We feel that simply
referring to unanimous cases as the "easy" ones is
inadequate; after all, these cases present legal questions
difficult enough that, in many cases, lower courts do not
34 See Figure 1: % Liberal Voting, 2009 Term.
35 id.
36 See Table 4: Agreement Scores, 2009 Tenn.
37See Figure 1: % Liberal Voting, 2009 Term.
38 id.
14
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achieve consensus. Ultimately, while political scientists
have fixated on non-unanimous cases for many decades-
in the search for the factors that lead justices to differ-it
may be time to offer a more thorough appraisal of
unanimous decisions. Future research may well wish to use
textual analysis to isolate specific legal or constitutional
concepts on which the justices are in agreement in order to
locate the reasons why justices may agree, as they do in
nearly half of the cases in the 2009 term.
15
